Now is the time for Israel to pursue shift in its defense doctrine — it’s the only way to stop Hamas from rebuilding

 In just a few weeks, Israel will mark the second anniversary of the October 7 invasion by Hamas and the massacre that followed.

Despite two years of war, including ground operations and relentless airstrikes, Hamas remains in Gaza and the war drags on. Forty-eight hostages are still in captivity, including 20 believed to be alive.

And now Israel has launched another large-scale offensive — with ground forces moving into Gaza City, a week after targeting Hamas leaders in Doha — that the government claims could finally eliminate Hamas as both a military force and governing entity.

In our new book, “While Israel Slept: How Hamas Surprised the Most Powerful Military in the Middle East,” Amir Bohbot and I trace the path from Hamas’ creation in the 1980s through decades of Israeli operations and wars until October 7, when thousands of terrorists poured across the border and into Israeli bases and kibbutzim.

We document the alarm bells that rang through the night of October 6 — intelligence reports of rocket launchers being uncovered and bunkers prepared for commanders — and the signs that had been visible for years, warning that Hamas was not just another terrorist group and that containment was a dangerous illusion.

This perspective matters as the war enters a new stage. Hamas will not simply release hostages because Israel or President Donald Trump demand it. Hostages are freed only under crushing military pressure and when Hamas concludes it has more to lose than to gain by holding them.

This was proven in November 2023 and again in January 2025, when significant pressure forced deals that brought Israelis home.

The strike last week against Hamas leaders in Doha can also be seen in this light. Even if it failed to kill its intended targets, the very fact that Hamas leaders were hunted in what they thought was their safest sanctuary may alter their calculations. No one wants to be the next commander caught in Israeli crosshairs while sipping coffee in Qatar.

But the proof will lie in what happens next. If talks collapse, if Hamas retaliates by abusing hostages, if Israel resumes a Gaza City offensive without a parallel diplomatic track, then the gamble will look reckless — and possibly self-defeating.

What became clear as we researched our book is that eliminating Hamas and bringing back the hostages is not enough. Israel must also undergo a fundamental shift in its defense doctrine. It must adopt a policy of preemptive strikes to prevent Hamas and Hezbollah from rebuilding once the high-intensity stage of war is over.

Throughout its history, Israel has rarely launched preemptive wars.

It watched as Syria amassed huge quantities of chemical weapons in the 1980s and 1990s and did not strike, even though it knew those weapons would be used against it. After the 2006 Lebanon War, it watched Hezbollah grow its arsenal from 20,000 rockets to more than 150,000 — many with precision guidance and heavy warheads — and did little more than occasional covert operations.

There have been only two exceptions: nuclear programs in Iraq and Syria and Iranian entrenchment in Syria.

But against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, Israel held back. Even as it watched tunnels dug, assault drills staged and rocket convoys move openly through Gaza City, it convinced itself this was posturing, not preparation.

In reality, it was both. 

As we document in the book, Hamas’s military buildup was not a secret. Israel’s military and intelligence agencies closely followed what Hamas was doing and watched as the group amassed a massive rocket arsenal, dug a tunnel network the size of the New York City subway and the London underground combined, and openly trained to storm IDF bases and abduct soldiers. 

But instead of working to undermine this military buildup and stop it, Israel adopted a policy of containment that rested on three key pillars.

First, it believed that Hamas could be bought off and that the terrorist group would prefer economic prosperity— in the form of monthly cash payments from Qatar as well as Gazans being allowed to work inside Israel — over its radical genocidal ideology. 

The second pillar of the containment policy was technology. This was based primarily on Iron Dome that intercepted the rockets fired from Gaza as well as the sophisticated physical barrier that Israel built along the border, above and below, to stop Hamas attack tunnels.

This gave Israel a feeling that it was impenetrable and that Hamas could never succeed in launching an invasion with thousands of fighters as happened on October 7.  

But it was wrong. On October 7, not a single fighter crossed into Israel through tunnels. They just blew more than 60 holes in the fence and crossed above ground. 

The third pillar of this policy was the way Israel prioritized the threats it faced along its borders. While Hamas’s ambitions were known, Israel believed that the technology and money could keep the group in place and, as a result, Israel could allocate its military and intelligence resources and assets to the threats that is believed to be greater: Iran and Hezbollah. 

This prioritization was evident in the way Israel has successfully weakened Hezbollah and Iran over the last year. The beeper attack against Hezbollah and the successful elimination of Iran’s top nuclear scientists and uranium enrichment facilities show that, when Israel wants to, it knows how to focus its resources and achieve amazing success. 

This policy of containment collapsed on October 7. Israel continues to pay the price since, with hostages who languish in Hamas captivity and in a growing sense of political and economic isolation around the world.

Which is why, regardless which mechanism ends the current war — whether a new government in Gaza, a UN resolution, or an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire — it ultimately does not matter. 

What matters is that Israel changes the rules of the game.

The next time the IDF sees rockets being moved, it must strike. The next time Hamas trains for an assault, it must strike. The next time a tunnel is dug, it must be destroyed.

The hope, of course, is that the trauma of October 7 will deter future enemies. But if history is any guide, terrorist groups will rebuild, plot and strike again. Israel can no longer afford to remain silent. Preemptive action must become the new pillar of its defense doctrine — not as a choice, but as the only way to ensure that the horror of that October morning is never repeated.