I’ve negotiated with Trump’s foes. He’s taking a huge gamble

 A decade ago, I sat next to Iran’s oil minister and senior Shell executives signing documents in front of a full auditorium and the world’s television cameras.

The agreements were to allow the energy giant to re-engage in oil and gas fields in the west of Iran. The plan was that within a year or two, Shell would be working with Iranian partners to renovate, modernise and develop the rusting and broken infrastructure and open new streams of exports to the world.

That didn’t happen. The nuclear deal signed by Barack Obama in July 2015 was starved of oxygen and then abandoned during Donald Trump’s first term in the White House.

Fast forward 10 years, and Trump is now working on his deal. After a damaging war for both sides, trust could not be lower.

Having served as Britain’s ambassador to Iran during the period immediately following the last deal, I find much of what is unfolding today depressingly familiar.

I arrived in Tehran on New Year’s Eve 2015 under circumstances that were a reminder of the region’s unpredictability. Driving up the main avenue from the airport into the massive sprawling city of 14 million people, I recalled the words of a former British ambassador who told me that after serving in the Arab Gulf states, coming to Iran “you realise you are in a real country”. From that, I took that Iran is not simply a problem to be managed or a threat to be contained. It is a large, sophisticated and deeply political society with competing centres of power. It also has a long strategic memory.

Just weeks after my arrival, our small embassy team gathered in the newly reopened British Embassy to mark Implementation Day, when UN sanctions were lifted. There was a genuine sense that a door had opened. What struck me in those early days was the extent to which some within the Iranian leadership were thinking beyond the narrow parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Shortly after my arrival, Iran’s then foreign minister, Javad Zarif, summoned the diplomatic corps to a meeting. He outlined an ambitious proposal for what was effectively an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East. Zarif argued that the region needed a framework through which rivals could manage disputes, reduce tensions and establish rules of behaviour.

He drew on the 1975 Helsinki process, which helped ease Cold War tensions and ultimately contributed to transforming the European security landscape. But Western governments, including the UK, largely dismissed the proposal. There were understandable reasons for scepticism. Iran’s actions across the region often contradicted its rhetoric. Yet, with hindsight, it may have deserved more consideration than it received.

The central lesson for Trump – who this weekend claimed Iran “will never learn” as the two countries exchanged attacks and traded blame for ceasefire violations – is not that diplomacy with Iran is impossible, but that diplomacy that fails to address underlying political realities is unlikely to last.

The 2015 agreement achieved important objectives, at least in the short term. It placed significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme and established an intrusive inspection regime. Yet, it still contained fatal weaknesses.

The first was political. Obama lacked the bipartisan support necessary to embed the agreement securely in American law. Instead, it rested largely on presidential authority. That made it vulnerable.

The second weakness was its scope. The agreement addressed the nuclear issue but left untouched a range of other disputes that still dominate the region. Iran’s missile programme was excluded as was Tehran’s support for armed groups and proxies across the Middle East. As a result, opponents on all sides were able to argue that the deal either went too far or not nearly far enough.

The deal collapsed not because diplomacy had failed, but because its political foundations proved too fragile. When Trump entered the White House, he was simply able to reverse US policy through another presidential action. The US withdrew and prevented many international businesses and financial institutions from participating in its implementation.

That history matters now – because many of the same forces remain in place.

One of the enduring missteps around Iran is the tendency to treat it as a unified actor. In reality, competing power centres coexist. During my time in Tehran, there was constant tension between the elected government and foreign ministry on one side and the security establishment, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on the other.

The political environment is now harder, yet the contest between those who favour engagement and those who benefit from confrontation remains.

Abbas Araghchi, one of the principal architects of the 2015 negotiations, remains a central figure as foreign minister. Much of the expertise assembled for the Obama-era talks is still present within Iran’s diplomatic machinery.

But today’s Iran is not the Iran of President Hassan Rouhani. The balance of power has shifted. The political space available for advocates of engagement is narrower than it was a decade ago. This is why the approach adopted by the US matters so much.

The Trump administration should seek to strengthen those within Iran who favour engagement. Measures that reinforce the narrative of Western hostility or seek to humiliate Iran are likely to play into the hands of hardliners.

The reported text of the proposed deal is extraordinary in ways that would have been difficult to imagine even a few years ago. Unlike previous arrangements, it includes addressing US sanctions, as well as broader questions of economic integration. It points towards the possibility of a fundamentally transformed relationship

If US companies invested in Iran – and there would be many hurdles to overcome – it would generate significant commercial benefits for the US. It would also lead to change from within the Islamic Republic – which so far has proved elusive.

Iran’s oil minister said this month that if Western stakeholders adhere to the spirit of the pact, hundreds of investment opportunities stand ready. The foreign minister spoke of a “trillion-dollar opportunity for the US”.

If realised, such an outcome would catalyse a strategic reordering of the Middle East. Over time, it could place Iran in a position far closer to the US than many observers would once have thought possible.

That is an enormous gamble for Trump.

This outcome would represent one of the most significant diplomatic achievements in the region for decades and could transform Trump’s foreign policy legacy. But there is a more plausible – and damaging – outcome.

For every member of the Iranian regime pushing for economic opening and integration, there are many others interested in maintaining Iran’s isolation. Continued conflict in Lebanon strengthens opponents of compromise. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz raises the prospect of escalation, and regional actors who view a US-Iran rapprochement as threatening have every reason to complicate things.

The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has long been sceptical of agreements that leave the current Iranian regime intact. Trump appears willing to explore a broader accommodation.

For now, diplomacy remains alive. Despite his track record, this US President is perhaps uniquely positioned to coerce support and neutralise opposition. If he does, it would be the crowning achievement of his presidency and may indeed merit a Nobel Prize.

A decade ago, Obama’s nuclear agreement opened a window that many hoped would remain open. It did not. Now, another window may be opening. The challenge is that the forces trying to shut it are already hard at work.